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Chapter 10
Means Testing Social Security
David Neumark and Elizabeth Powers
Worldwide population aging has brought into sharp focus several controver-
sial features of social security systems. For instance, it is often thought that
the "contributions" a worker makes to the social security system are not
clearly and positively linked to the benefits ultimately received.! Indeed, the
complexity of the benefit calculation in the U.S. social security system
makes it unlikely that most workers understand the relationship between
their next dollar of payroll tax contributed and their ultimate benefit. This
may explain why many younger workers express the belief that the present
system is unsustainable and they will receive no retirement benefit. When
workers believe that most or all of their social security payroll deduction is
net tax, this has work disincentives. In turn, such disincentives may hurt
economic growth and impose efficiency costs on the economy (Kotlikoff
and Sachs 1997; Feldstein 1997). Another potential growth-inhibiting fea-
ture of large unfunded social security systems is their pay-as-you-go nature.
It is often argued that such a system supplants self-financed retirement
saving with intergenerational transfers, thereby reducing the capital stock
(Kotlikoff 1979). A further criticism of a pay-as-you-go system is that it has
generated excessive redistribution from younger to older cohorts (Kotlikoff
1992; Auerbach et al. 1992).
Despite these criticisms, most experts acknowledge that there is one goal
many public pension systems around the world have achieved: they have
prevented many elderly households from sliding into poverty. In the United
States, the poorest 40 percent of elderly and disabled households receive 80
percent of their income from social security, and social security benefits lift
6 percent of the population above official poverty lines (Aaron 1997). Con-
sequently, there is little support for eliminating public retirement income
support systems entirely, at least in the United States and other developed
nations. On the other hand, if reforms are required, many believe that
cutting benefits for the relatively affluent would be a useful way to achieve
system solvency. In this chapter we explore the pros and cons of converting
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social security from a universal entitlement program to a program based on
individual need in old age: that is, "means-testing" social security benefits.
If social security benefits were fully means tested, then a retiree's benefit
would be reduced in accordance with his post-retirement income, as well as
his (real and/ or financial) asset holdings. Partial means tests might reduce
benefits as income rose, but could ignore assets (or vice versa): alternatives
migh t take only some components ofincome or assets into account when de-
termining benefits. For example, the Concord Coalition advocates a social
security "affluence test" that would cut benefits 10 percent for retired house-
holds with income between $40,000 and $49,000, and would increase the re-
duction by 10 percentage points for each additional $10,000 of income, to a
maximum of an 85 percent reduction in benefits.2 This approach is a dra-
matic departure from the current system, in which benefits depend posi-
tively on past income, while (aside from the "retirement test," discussed
below) they are taxed lightly, if at all. A means-tested program might also
act as a "safety net" or "bottom tier" of a multi-tier retirement system,
for example, in conjunction with a defined contribution public system
(Mitchell and Zeldes 1996).3
Examining the Current System
It is natural to ask whether the present social security system already incor-
porates any means-test-like features, since expansion of such features could
afford a natural way to create a broader means-tested system. Before 1990,
social security benefits in the United States were reduced by $1 for every $2
of earned income above an exempt amount. Recently, benefits have been
reduced at a more generous rate of $1 for every $3 of earned income.4 A
penalty on labor income, or "retirement test," is clearly necessary for a
system intended as a retirement income support, whether it is means-tested
or not. That the retirement test is not intended as a means test is evident
from the fact that no other types of income directly reduce social security
benefits. Since 1983, some retirees' benefits have been subject to the federal
income tax; the proceeds are returned to the Old Age Survivors and Dis-
ability Insurance (OASDI) trust fund. But fewer than a quarter ofall benefi-
ciaries pay this tax, and only the most affluent retirees "return" a significant
share of their benefits. Only at household income categories exceeding
$50,000 does the tax burden exceed 10 percent of benefits received.5 Fur-
ther, asset holdings do not affect benefits at all, except to the extent that
asset income or realized capital gains might ultimately contribute towards
the application of the federal tax to social security benefits.
For these reasons, we believe it is safe to say that a social security program
in which benefits were targeted to needy recipients through a means test
would look quite different from today's system. The simplest imaginable
system would be similar to the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pro-
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gram that has two separate tests, one for income and the other for assets (we
discuss this program at length below). Ifincome exceeds a given amount, no
benefits are received. If income is below the limit but positive, benefits are
reduced (perhaps dollar-for-dollar). If assets exceed a fixed limit, no bene-
fits are received (alternatively, a benefit reduction rate might be applied to
the excess).6 This simple scheme could be made more complex by applying
different limits or benefit reduction rates to different types of earnings (for
instance, treating earned income more harshly to preserve something like a
"retirement test"); or by exempting some assets (like an owner-occupied
home).
A more sophisticated scheme would unifY the treatment of income and
assets. By applying a formula to annuitize wealth stocks (i.e., to convert a
stock ofwealth into an equivalent income flow), benefit reduction formulas
could be applied to wealth as they are to income.? If society expects recip-
ients to expend all resources prior to their death, then the entire stock of
real and financial wealth might be subject to the annuitizing formula.
Again, however, one could apply different weights to different types of in-
come and annuitized wealth, or possibly exclude some assets from the an-
nuitization formula.
The primary debate in the United States has been over whether moderate
changes that preserve the existing social security system will do, or whether
a privatized or partially privatized system would be superior. The argument
over whether the gains from a privatized system are real or illusory is fairly
complex (Mitchell and Zeldes 1996). The relative merits of means testing,
on the other hand, appear straightforward. Most obviously, means testing,
by restricting who can receive benefits, or by offering only small benefits to
all but the "neediest" elderly, could dramatically shrink the size of the social
security system, and hence enable the payroll tax to be greatly reduced. It is
the distortionary impact of this tax (an inefficiency that increases with the
square of the tax) that is viewed as the most troublesome component of the
current system by many (Kotlikoff and Sachs 1997; Feldstein 1997). If it
caused the social security system to shrink dramatically, means testing would
greatly reduce the redistribution from younger to older generations that
has been the subject of so much recent criticism. In particular, even under a
pay-as-you-go system, means testing would halt redistribution from current
workers with moderate lifetime incomes to the currently-affluent elderly.
Finally, benefits would be determined by actual post-retirement resources
and not by one's earnings history, so that benefits intended to help low-
income households would not be paid to well-off retirees.
One drawback of means testing is its potential negative impact on saving.
That is, when social security benefits depend in some way on one's level of
financial assets (or the income these assets produce during retirement),
some people might choose not to save, or to save very little. This view has
been extremely influential in the current debate and appears to have pre-
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eluded serious discussion of a means-tested reform option. For example,
in an appendix to the report of the Bipartisan Commission on Entitle-
ment and Tax Reform (1995), several experts endorsed the statement that
"Means testing would tax ... saving by cutting Social Security as income
from private saving increases, conveying the message: Don't save or we will
punish you for your frugality by denying you Social Security" (112). Sim-
ilarly, the Technical Panel (1997) reported to the recent Advisory Council
on Social Security that it "opposed means-testing social security benefits on
the basis ofother retirement income or accumulated wealth. To avoid loss of
social security benefits, some workers might reduce their own retirement
saving or persuade employers to shift compensation from pension contribu-
tions to earnings. Either response would lower savings and private retire-
ment incomes" (6).
Equally damaging to the means testing case is the fact that new work
disincentives may be created by a means test. Should social security benefits
in a means-tested program be reduced or restricted on the basis of asset
holdings at retirement, this would discourage the additional work needed to
finance retirement savings in "ordinary" (non-tax-favored) savings, or in
defined contribution private pension schemes. Income testing of benefits
may also discourage work, per se. If social security benefits are reduced or
eliminated when post-retirement income increases, then defined benefit
pension payments or annuitized income from defined contribution plans
would reduce public benefits. Depending on the exact rules of a means-
tested program, workers might have an incentive to retire early. This is
because additional private pension benefits might be partially or completely
offset by reduced public benefits, and could even disqualify retirees from
receiving any public benefits.
These possible negative effects ofa means-tested social security policy may
or may not outweigh its benefits. Despite the fact that means testing has
been so resolutely rejected in the current debate, there is actually little
direct evidence on the possible magnitude of the potential adverse effects.
In the next section, we briefly discuss the current scant evidence on the
likely impact of means testing public retirement income programs, and
then present new evidence on the potential labor supply distortions from a
means test, based on evidence from the United States.
Previous Evidence on Means Testing
An extensive literature seeks to estimate the effects of changing various
parameters of the social security system on saving and labor supply behavior,
relying on variation in program parameters across individuals to identify the
effects of interest (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier 1984,1986,1991; Burtless
and Moffitt 1985). This literature may be fruitfully applied to assessing
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changes to the existing system that preserve its basic structure, but it is less
relevant to the means testing debate.8
One of the few rigorous analyses of the means-testing option appears in
Feldstein (1987), who argued that "a means-tested program with benefits
set at the optimal level may induce some utility-maximizing workers to save
nothing. Although their resulting consumption in retirement would then
be less than they would have chosen without a social security program, the
utility value of the extra consumption during working years more than
offsets the reduced consumption during retirement" (470). An overlapping
generations model is employed to investigate the circumstances under
which society would be better off under a universal pay-as-you-go system
than a targeted (means-tested) pay-as-you-go system. In this model, workers
receive earnings when young, and no income when old, but may save from
first period income if they wish. Feldstein considers a particularly simple
means test, where only zero-savers can collect benefits in old age. Not sur-
prisingly, he finds that the relative advantages of a means-tested system
depend critically on the responsiveness of private saving to the disincentive
created by the means test. He concludes that an income test is the right
"means" to use, but this finding relies on the assumption that income is
exogenous. If it were not, one would expect efficiency losses to result from
an income test as well.
Evidence from other countries is also germane. For instance, Australia's
social security system has been means tested since its inception in 1909,
although the design of the means test has varied greatly over the years.9 The
system's initial design was simple, with separately applied income and asset
tests. In the 1960s, the asset and income means tests were "merged." A 10
percent rate of return was imputed on assets over a disregard level, and this
imputed return was added to other income and affected benefits through
the income test. Controversy over the treatment of assets culminated in the
asset test being dropped altogether in 1976; by 1985, however, an asset test
was reintroduced in an effort to rein in program costs. lO Under the new
rules, the participation rate dropped to 65 percent ofpeople of pensionable
age, from 74 percent in 1983. Currently the Australian old-age benefit re-
flects an average wage replacement rate of only around 20 percent. There-
fore, while many elderly families in Australia receive some benefit despite
the means tests (the all-time high was 78 percentin 1978), the "full" benefit
is low, and many receive even lower benefits due to the means test.
The notion that asset tests could discourage saving had been a concern of
Australian policy makers since the system's inception. For example, the
asset test was already liberalized to exempt the home in 1912, because of the
view that "taking it into account penalized thrift and discouraged home
ownership" (Schultz et al. 1991: 224). However, the controversy continued.
"During the postwar years ... the main argument voiced against means
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testing related to the impact [on] ... the propensity of individuals to save.
Means testing was seen as a major disincentive to saving. It was argued that
there was little point in saving for retirement if, upon reaching the age-
pension eligibility age, the retiree was denied a pension because of the
means test" (225). The income test has also been frequently changed. Over
the years gifts from children, asset income, and capital gains income have all
been the subject of policy changes.
Considering this lengthy and varied experience with means testing, the
lack of econometric evidence on the effect of means testing on Australians'
work and retirement saving patterns is somewhat surprising. One explana-
tion may be that the system's complex and inconsistent treatment ofvarious
types of income and assets is perceived to create a greater problem with "tax
avoidance" than with changes in real activity like work and consumption.
For example, when assets were not tested prior to 1986, retirees apparently
shifted wealth into no- or low-interest accounts to escape the income test. ll
Loopholes probably affected the post-retirement composition of assets or
income more than the real pre-retirement behavior that generated the re-
sources in the first place.
An Alternative Approach to Studying Means Testing
In the remainder of this chapter we attempt to draw inferences about the
potential behavioral responses to means testing social security by examining
the effects of the United States Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pro-
gram for the aged. Here we offer evidence on the effects of an income- and
asset-tested retirement program on the pre-retirement labor supply of po-
tential recipients. In our analysis, we exploit the state-level variation in SSI
benefits to estimate the effects of SSI on labor supply. We use data on male-
headed households from waves 4 and 5 of the Survey of Income Program
Participation (SIPP), covering individuals in the 1983-1986 period, to esti-
mate the effects of state SSI supplements via a difference-in-difference ap-
proach that controls for variation in labor supply behavior across states and
across different types of individuals. In related work (Neumark and Powers,
forthcoming) we examine the effect ofvariation in SSI benefits on saving of
those approaching the age of eligibility for benefits, finding that higher
benefits reduce pre-retirement saving among likely program participants. 12
In our view, the SSI program for the aged has many parallels to the type of
means tested social security program that might emerge from social security
reform process. Part of the SSI program provides payments to the poor
elderly (aged 65 and over) .13 The federal government sets eligibility criteria
and benefit levels for the federal component of the program. The federal
government also specifies maximum benefit levels for couples and individ-
uals, which are reduced by income from other sources, including social
security retirement and disability benefits. (The first $20 per month of non-
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means-tested transfer income, the first $65 of earned income, plus one-half
of remaining earnings, are disregarded in reducing SSI benefits.) Thus,
other sources of retirement income influence both eligibility for SSI and the
size of potential benefits. Financial resources also affect eligibility. For exam-
ple, as of 1985 (corresponding roughly to the time period covered by our
data) individuals with over $1,600 in countable assets, and couples with over
$2400 in countable assets, were ineligible. 14 In 1984 there were 1.55 million
persons receiving SSI payments who were eligible because of age (Commit-
tee on Ways and Means 1995).1.';
Though the federal government sets eligibility criteria and benefit levels,
states may also supplement federal SSI benefits. For example, in January
1985 the maximum federal monthly benefit was $325 for an individual, and
$488 for a couple. The highest state benefit was in California, with a max-
imum combined monthly benefit of $504 for an individual and $936 for a
couple. 16 In December 1985 the average federal monthly benefit paid was
$146 for individuals and $232 for couples, and the average state supple-
ments were $97 and $257, respectively, with 39 percent of SSI recipients
receiving state supplements (Kahn 1987).
Empirical Analysis
To derive empirical estimates, we use a sample of male heads of house-
holds drawn from the SIPP, which when weighted serves as a nationally-
representative sample of households. 17 Households are interviewed every
four months (each four-month interval is referred to as a "wave") for two to
three years. Most questions are asked retrospectively about the previous four
months. This paper uses the first (1984) panel of the SIPP, covering the
period from October 1983 throughJuly 1986.
Several measures of labor force activity are used as dependent variables
for the analysis. A binary employment variable is used that equals one if the
individual reports positive hours ofwork in the first month ofwave 4. Actual
hours of work in that month are also studied. We also examine effects on
years ofcovered social security employment (a variable collected in a special
wave 5 topical module), which provides a longer-term perspective. Finally,
because family labor supply and the wages earned by each family member
may influence post-retirement income and wealth, we also examine some
results regarding the possible impact of the SSI program on monthly family
earned income in wave 4; this also gives us a convenient measure of aggre-
gate total family labor supply.
Descriptive statistics for the sample of men aged 40-64 for whom we
estimate labor supply effects appear in Table 1. Of this group, 83 percent of
the group is employed in wave 4, and weekly hours of work average 37.
Average years of covered social security employment are just under 23 years
for this group, and average monthly family earnings are $2,628. Each house-
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics and Determinants ofSSI Participation
Employed, wave 4
Hours, wave 4
Years of covered Social
Security employment, wave 5
Family earnings, wave 4
Maximum state SSI supplement
>20% offederal benefit
MaximumSSI
benefit, individual
MaximumSSI
benefit, couple
Currently authorized for
food stamps
Years authorized for
food stamps
Less than high school
Some college
College graduate
Black
Never married
Divorced/widowed/
separated/spouse absent
N
Descriptive
Statistics,
Male Household
Heads Aged 40-64
.83
37.03
(19.45)
22.88
(13.80)
2628.39
(2107.47)
.20
365.49
(58.43)
566.00
(137.83)
.04
.06
(.65)
.26
.17
.24
.08
.03
.11
4560
Promt for SSI
Participation,
Male Household Heads
Aged 65+
.022**
(.007)
.019
(.013)
.015**
(.003)
.05**
(.01)
-.01
(.02)
-.004
(.02)
.024**
(.009)
.04**
(.01)
.007
(.007)
1787
Source: Authors' calculations, 1984 SIPP. Column 1 reports means, with standard deviations in
parentheses. Maximum SSI benefit is combined federal and state, obtained from the 1985
Green Book (Committee on Ways and Means 1985), and is based on current marital status.
Classification of states providing supplements higher than 20 percent of the federal benefit is
based on whether the supplement for either an indh~dual or a couple exceeds this amount.
Column 2 reports partial derivatives of the participation probability, with standard errors based
on probit coefficients in parentheses; SSI benefits are measured in hundreds of dollars. High
school graduates are the reference category. ** indicates statistically significantly different
from zero at the 5-percent level, and * at the 10-percent level. All estimates are weighted.
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hold is assigned a maximum state SSI benefit based on household composi-
tion (whether the household is comprised of an individual or a couple) and
state of residence. For the empirical analysis, we create a variable that equals
one for observations in states in which the benefit exceeds 20 percent of the
federal maximum (for either individuals or couples), and zero for states
that do not supplement the federal benefit; we exclude observations from
the intermediate states. IS In addition to the high benefit states, states such as
Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, and Utah paid very low supplements. Twenty per-
cent ofour sample resides in states with state SSI supplements exceeding 20
percent of the federal benefit. 19 Average maximum combined (federal and
state) benefits are $365 for individuals, and $566 for adults.
Demographic variables in the analysis include race (black or non-black),
marital status (married spouse present, never married, and ever married),
and education (less than high school, high school graduate, some college,
and college graduate). As explained below, we also require estimates of the
probability of participation in SSI at or after age 65. We obtain these esti-
mates by studying the determinants of SSI participation among those aged
65 or over, based on participation of the male at any time during wave 4.
We are interested in estimating the effects of the potential receipt of SSI
benefits on various labor supply measures, denoted Y. Two factors influence
the potential value of SSI benefits: the level of the benefits, and the likeli-
hood of receiving them. Thus, for example, we might expect a person with
characteristics associated with low permanent income (such as low educa-
tion) , in a state with high SSI benefits, to experience the greatest labor
supply disincentives. In contrast, a white, married college graduate is ex-
tremely unlikely to be eligible for SSI, whether he resides in a state with high
or low benefits. Thus, to estimate the effects of SSI, we focus on variation in
labor supply behavior associated with high SSI benefits for those with a
relatively high likelihood of eligibility.
We therefore begin by identifying exogenous characteristics associated
with likely future SSI receipt. By studying workers over age 65, we can iden-
tify characteristics associated with a high likelihood of SSI participation. We
then distinguish among workers under age 65 based on these characteris-
tics, defining a dummy variable "Part" to equal one for likely participants
(based on a chosen threshold for the estimated probability of participating
upon reaching age 65), and zero otherwise.20
Perhaps the simplest test for effects of SSI on labor supply would be to
estimate a regression equation of the form:
(1) Y=0:'Part·Age4049 + 13-Part-Age5059 + "Y' Part'Age6064
+ 0+ TJ'Age5059 + e'Age6064 + XI\J + E,
where the age variables are dummy variables for the indicated ranges, and
the sample includes individuals aged 40-64. The matrix X includes demo-
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graphic controls. This can be thought of as a "federal experiment"; state
benefit levels are not used to introduce variation among likely participants
in incentives to go on SSI. For reasons discussed below, we do not rely on this
test, but it is useful in understanding the empirical procedure we use.
The estimates of ex, 13, and "I indicate differences in labor supply be-
tween individuals likely to be eligible for SSI, and those unlikely to be eligi-
ble. For example, "I measures the behavioral difference between 60-64-year-
olds likely to be eligible and those unlikely to be eligible (Ylpart~1.Age6064~1 -
Ylpart~O.Age6064~1)' and ("I - ex) measures the difference in the change
in Y from ages 40-49 to ages 60-64 between likely participants and
non-participants ([Ylpart~1.Age6064=1 - Yl part=1.Age4049=1] - [Ylpart~OAge6064~1 -
Ylpart~O.Age4049~1]) .21 If SSI reduces the labor supply of likely participants, we
should find at least one of two effects: "I <0, because likely participants are
predicted to work less; or ("I - ex) <0, because the work disincentive on
likely participants becomes more evident as they approach the age of eligi-
bility for SSI.
One might also expect, a priori, that estimates of "I and ("I - ex) -rather
than 13 and (13 - ex) - are of greatest interest and are more likely to reflect
disincentive effects because, for a number of reasons, the influence of SSI
should be strongest for workers nearing the age of eligibility. First, given
stochastic influences on earnings and wealth, older workers can form better
predictions of post-retirement income. Second, workers may pay more at-
tention to the potential receipt of SSI benefits as they approach the age of
eligibility (paralleling findings in Mitchell 1988). We therefore focus on
estimated effects for individuals aged 60-64, but also report effects for those
aged 50-59.
There are competing reasons to prefer using estimates of'Y and of ("I - ex)
(and similarly for 13) to draw inferences about the effects of SSI. One reason
to prefer estimates of "I is because ("I - ex) is identified from differences in
behavior across cohorts, which requires the assumption of constant be-
havior across cohorts, or at least that cross-cohort differences are the same
across states; in contrast, identification of "I does not require such assump-
tions. On the other hand, looking at ("I - ex) effectively uses workers aged
40-49 in the state as a control group, because it identifies the effects of SSI
from changes in the behavior of 60-64-year-olds relative to this group.
There may be state-specific differences in behavior oflikely participants in a
state regardless of their age, stemming from economic conditions, tax pol-
icy, or other income-support programs. As a consequence, changes in be-
havior with age, rather than levels, may provide more reliable information.
We report both types of estimates, but focus more on the changes with age
captured in (13 - ex) and ("I - ex).
Of course, while estimates of ex, 13, and "I, in equation 1 could represent
the effects of the SSI program, the estimates are based on a rather tenuous
identifying assumption - namely, that in the absence of the program the
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labor supply behavior of men (or families) with characteristics associated
with SSI participation would be the same as those of other men. That is, the
group for which Part = 0 (for example, highly educated men) serves as the
"control group" for the estimation of the effects of SSI. It is well known,
however, that age profiles of labor supply differ systematically with variables
such as education, marital status, and race. This may arise because health is
correlated with these characteristics, or because they affect optimal retire-
ment decisions. In addition, if likely participants are most dependent on
current income for consumption, a comparison with unlikely participants
would bias the results against finding negative effects of SSI benefits on
labor supply. Because the variables that determine Part are systematically
related to labor supply for reasons that may have nothing to do with SSI,
estimation of equation I will lead to biased estimates of the effects ofSSI.
The empirical strategy we follow instead, therefore, is to exploit state-level
variation in the provision of SSI benefits. Individuals in states without state
supplementation of SSI benefits, but with characteristics associated with SSI
receipt, serve as a much more compelling control group with which to
compare the behavior of individuals in states with state supplementation
and with characteristics associated with SSI receipt. At the same time, state-
specific labor supply profiles may also differ in ways that are correlated with
SSI benefits. Therefore, we want to identifY the effects of SSI from relative
differences between the behavior of likely participants and unlikely partici-
pants in supplement and non-supplement states, effectively using the un-
likely participants to control for these state differences. For example, older
high school dropouts (who are much more likely to be SSI participants) may
work less, or decrease their labor supply more as they age, compared with
more-educated workers. But the difference-in-difference framework only
infers an effect of SSI if the difference between the labor supply of older
high school dropouts and older more-educated workers is larger in states
that supplement SSI than in states that do not.
An intuitive way to think about the approach is to imagine dividing the
sample into states that generously supplement SSI, and states that do not
supplement SSI. We then estimate equation 1 only for the subset of states
that do not supplement SSI, and a similar equation
(2) Y= u'·Part'Age4049 + W'Part'Age5059 + 'Y' 'Part'Age6064
+ 3' + 1]' 'Age5059 + e' ·Age6064 + XIjJ + e'
for the states that supplement SSI. Estimates for these two subsamples pro-
vide the relevant difference-in-difference estimates. For example, focusing
on 60-64-year-olds, "I' and "I each measure the difference in behavior be-
tween likely and unlikely participants within a particular type of state (i.e.,
high and low supplement states). Here "I serves as the "baseline" difference
in behavior of those with characteristics associated with participation in SSI,
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and therefore ("(' - "() captures the effect of SSI supplements on the labor
supply of likely participants. Similarly, ("(' - a') - ("( - a) captures the
effect ofSSI on changes in labor supply with age, based on the difference in
behavior between likely and unlikely participants in high supplement states
versus low supplement states.
Note that, as discussed above, this framework allows the age profile of
labor supply for a whole state population (captured in I), TI, and e, or 1)', TI',
and 6') to differ for states that do and do not supplement SSl. This is
potentially important to control for biases that might arise from a relation-
ship between policy and other sources ofvariation in the level or age profile
of Y in a state (e.g., if states in which older individuals have a higher pro-
pensity to work also tend to offer more generous SSI supplements). Rather
than estimate equations 1 and 2 using separate state samples, we obtain
difference-in-difference estimates from an interactive specification esti-
mated for the pooled sample of states:
(3) Y = cx oPartoAge4049 + l3oPartoAge5059 + ,/"PartoAge6064 + 8 +TjoAge5059
+ eoAge6064 + cx 'oPart°Age4049oSupp + I3'°PartoAge5059oSupp
+ 'Y 'o PartoAge6064·Supp + 8' oSupp + Tj' oAge5059oSupp
+ e'oAge6064oSupp + XIjJ + E
where "Supp" is a dummy variable for states with generous SSI supplements.
In this specification the estimate of "(' is the difference-in-difference esti-
mate of the effect ofSSI on Yfor those aged 60-64, and the estimate of ("(' -
a') measures the effect on the change in Y from ages 40-49 to ages 60-
64.22•23 The pooled regression lets us easily assess the statistical significance
of our difference-in-difference estimates, since the estimates are obtained
from a single estimation.
Results for 551 Participation
The probit estimates for SSI participation among men aged 65 or older
appear in column 2 of Table 1. One would expect that more generous SSI
benefits also increase the likelihood of participation; this is confirmed in
the table, as the estimated coefficient on the generous state SSI supplement
variable is positive (.022) and strongly significant. Education, race, and
marital history variables are also strongly associated with SSI participation.
High school dropouts are significantly more likely than high school gradu-
ates to be SSI participants, with a differential of 5 percentage points. Black
and never-married men are also considerably more likely to be on SSl.
Finally, to capture unobservables related to low permanent income, and
possibly also unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to participate in
income-support programs, information on food stamp enrollment is in-
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cluded in the probit; the number of years authorized, in particular, is
strongly positively associated with SSI participation.24.25
We use these probit estimates to generate predicted probabilities of par-
ticipation in SSI for those aged 40-64, which are used in turn are used to
construct the variable Part that is used in labor supply models like equation
3. For most of the specifications we estimate, we define Part to equal one
when the predicted probability is at or above the 90th centile of the distribu-
tion of the predicted probabilities, and zero otherwise. Based on the pro-
portion of participants among those aged 65 and over, approximately one-
half of those above this centile should end up on SSI. Selecting which
threshold to use presents a trade-off. On the one hand, a high threshold
isolates the effects of SSI on those who are most likely to participate, for
whom labor supply disincentives may be stronger. On the other hand, those
with higher probabilities may need to work more to finance current con-
sumption, since they tend to be poor, or may initially work sufficiently little
that disincentive effects are difficult to detect. We therefore also present
evidence based on higher and lower thresholds.
Results for Labor Supply
Before proceeding to investigate the impact of SSI on labor supply, we
present estimates of the age profiles for the alternative dependent variables
measuring labor supply for our sample of men aged 40-64 in Panel A of
Table 2. The equations in each column also include controls for educa-
tion, race, and marital status. For each of the four dependent variables-
employment, hours, years of covered social security employment, and fam-
ily earnings - there are substantial declines with age, particularly for those
aged 60-64. The decline in years of covered social security employment
with age must reflect cohort effects, because it is a cumulative measure of
labor supply.
In Panel B ofTable 2, we proceed to the difference-in-difference estimates
of equation 3 to estimate the effects of SSI on labor supply.26 The first two
rows contain estimates of 13' and "I' for the various dependent variables.
Recall that these coefficients measure the differences-for individuals at
ages 50-59 and 60-64 respectively - between the behavior of likely partici-
pants and unlikely participants in states with generous SSI supplements,
using the difference in behavior between likely and unlikely participants in
non-supplementing states as a "control." In all four columns the estimate of
"I' is negative, consistent with the hypothesis that the pre-retirement labor
supply of older likely participants in generous states is relatively lower. How-
ever, none of these estimates are significantly different from zero. There is
even less evidence of negative labor supply effects from the estimates of 13' ,
which are positive and significant in the 5- or lO-percent level for the three
direct labor supply measures.
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TABLE 2. Estimates ofAge Profiles and Difference-in-Difference Estimates of EffeclS
ofSSI on Labor Supply, 90th Centile of Participation Probabilities Used to
Define Likely SSI Participants, Male Household Heads Aged 40-64
Years of
Covered
Employed Hours Soc. Sec. Family
EstimatoT Probit Tobit Employment Earnings Tobit
A. Age profiles oflabor supply measures
Age 50-59 -.10** -5.90** 2.76** -152.69**
(.01) (.70) (.54) (69.91 )
Age 60-64 -.27** -21.12** -6.25** -1526.84**
(.01 ) (.91) (.70) (90.73)
B. Difference-in-difference estimates ofEffects ofSSI
Effect of SSI on .093* 12.14** 6.70** 78.24
50-59 year- (.055) (4.04) (3.08) (390.48)
aids (W)
Effect of SSI on -.062 -5.38 -3.03 -36.22
60-64 year- (.071 ) (5.92) (4.55) (567.95)
olds (-y')
Effect of SSI on -.074 .21 3.59 -1067.38*
50-59 year- (.083) (5.69) (4.32) (551.44)
olds relative to
40-49 year
aids (W - ct')
Effect of SSI on -.229** -17.31** -6.14 -1181.84*
60-64 year- (.095) (7.17) (5.48) (689.67)
aids relative to
40-49 year
aids (-y' - ct')
Log likelihood -1122.9 -11554.1 -10659.4 -23432.0
Source: Authors' calculations, 1984 SIPP. There are 4560 observations in Panel A, and 2940
observations in Panel B. See Table 1 for details. Specifications in Panels A and B also include
dummy variables for education, race, and marital status. Specifications in Panel B correspond
to equation (3) in the text. The specifications also include dummy variables for age (50-59 and
60-64), a dummy variable for states with maximum benefits for either individuals or couples
exceeding 20% of the federal benefit, interactions between the "high supplement" variable
and age dummy variables (for ages 50-59 and 60 - 64), and interactions between the age
dummies for all ranges (40-49, 50-59, and 60-64) and a dummy variable for "likely partici-
pants." The coefficients reported in the table are from the variables interacting age, "high
supplement," and "likely participant." The "likely participant" dummy variable is define to
equal one for observations for which the predicted probability of participation in 55I, using the
estimates from column 2 of Table I, exceeds .0799, which is the 90th centile of the weighted
distribution of estimated probabilities. Observations from states that supplement 5SI, but with
supplements below 20%, are excluded. ** indicates statistically significantly different from zero
at the five-percent level, and * at the Io-percent level. All estimates are weighted.
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We also report estimates of (13' - ex') and ('Y/ - ex'), which describe the
changes relative to individuals aged 40-49. In this case, there is considerably
stronger evidence of labor supply disincentive effects of SSI. In particular,
the estimated drop-offs from ages 40-49 to 60-64 are statistically significant
at the 5-percent level for employment and hours, and at the 100percent level
for earnings. Furthermore, looking at the drop-offs from ages 40-49 to 50-
59, two of the four estimates are negative (one significant at the 10-percent
level), and there are no longer significant positive effects. This evidence,
and the differences compared with the estimates of 13' and 'Y/, suggest that
state-specific differences in labor supply mask life-eycle changes induced
by SSP?
There is a potentially important source of misspecification in the Panel
B estimates. This arises because states with high SSI supplements also
offer relatively generous benefits in other transfer programs, including, of
course, SSI for the disabled. These programs may be available not only to
those eligible for SSI for the aged, but also to younger men, in particular the
disabled. As a consequence, we may see labor supply effects among those
below age 65 that are a response to programs other than SSI for the aged. To
better isolate the incentive effects of SSI for the aged, and in particular to
eliminate spurious relationships that may arise through relationships be-
tween disability and income-support programs available to the younger dis-
abled, we re-estimate the equations from Panel B ofTable 2 excluding from
the sample individuals with any self-reported work-impairing disability.
Estimates for this subsample appear in Panel A ofTable 3. The results for
ages 60-64 are now more fully consistent with the labor supply disincentive
effects of SSI. As before, the estimates of ('Y' - ex') are negative, and esti-
mates for employment and hours are both significant at the five-percent
level. For this sample, though, the estimates of 'Y' are also negative, and
significant at the 5- or 10-percent level for employment and hours. In con-
trast, the estimates of 13' are no longer positive and statistically significant.
Thus, once we exclude individuals whose behavior is most likely to be influ-
enced by other programs whose generosity is potentially correlated with
supplemental state benefits for SSI for the aged, state-specific differences in
labor supply measures at all ages are less important, and the estimated
effects of labor supply are more similar whether or not we use the 40-49-
year-olds as a control groUp.28
Next, we consider problems that arise in measuring features of state SSI
programs. In particular, as mentioned earlier, some states choose to admin-
ister their own programs, in which case they can set their own eligibility
criteria. Therefore we further restrict the sample to include only the subset
of states with federal administration of SSI, to ensure that we are looking at
states with federal administration and therefore identical benefit formulas
and asset rules (see Appendix Table AI). This is potentially important be-
cause in states with policy features that differ from the federal ones, one can
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TABLE 3. Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects ofSSI on Labor Supply,
Excluding Individuals with Work-Impairing Disability, and States with
State-Administered SSI Programs, Male Household Heads Aged 40-64
Years of
Covered
Soc. Sec. Family
Employed Hours Employment Earnings
-926.06
(815.46)
Tobit
-312.87
(436.36)
-107.44
(693.68)
-1131.49*
(611.21)
-2.73
(5.61)
Tobit
2.31
(3.00)
-4.94
(4.79)
4.52
(4.18)
-17.88**
(7.33)
-.194**
(.09)
A. Excluding individuals with work-impairing disability
Estimator Probit Tobit
EffectofSSI on 50-59 .013 6.10
year-olds (13') (.05) (3.93)
Effect of SSI on 60-64 - .I 18* - I 2.96*
year-olds ("'I') (.07) (6.24)
Effect of SSI on 50-59 -0.63 1.17
year-olds relative to (.08) (5.49)
40-49 year olds (W - a')
Effect of SSI on 60-64
year-olds relative to
40-49 year olds ("'I' - a')
B. Also excluding states with state-administered SS! programs
Effect of SSI on .031 8.84 6.71 -464.10
50-59 year- (.06) (5.06) (4.04) (553.54)
olds (13')
Effect of SSI on -.132* -12.13 -3.23 -4.84
60-64 year- (.08) (7.49) (6.01 ) (820.36)
olds ("'I')
Effect of SSI on -.073 3.15 5.24 -1581.19*
50-59 year- (.10) (7.43) (5.93) (822.08)
olds relative to
40-49 year
olds (W - a')
Effect of SSI on -.236** -17.82* -4.70 -1121.93
60-64 year- (.12) (9.24) (7.40) (1019.90)
olds relative to
40-49 year
olds ("'I' - a')
Source: Authors' calculations, 1984 SIPP. There are 2478 observations in Panel A, and 1284
observations in Panel B. Specifications correspond to those in Panel B of Table 2. See notes to
Table 2 for additional details.
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be eligible for the state but not the federal benefit, or vice versa,29 making it
difficult to identify the appropriate maximum benefit level. As reported in
Panel B of Table 3, the estimates are very similar to those in Panel A. In
particular, the estimates of 'V are negative for each of the labor supply mea-
sures (and significant at the 10-percent level for employment). The esti-
mates of ('VI - a') are negative and significant at the 5- or lO-percent level
for employment and hours. Given the considerable reduction in the sample
size, coupled with little change in the point estimates, our last analysis re-
verts to the sample in Panel A ofTable 3.
The evidence to this point indicates that generous supplemental state
SSI benefits reduce the labor supply of older men. In any difference-in-
difference estimation, it is instructive to ask which differences identify the
effect. In particular, in our case we estimate the effects ofSSI from the differ-
ence between the labor supply of likely participants and unlikely partici-
pants in high supplement states, relative to the same difference in low sup-
plement states. Thus, the estimates of 'V' can be identified largely from a
difference in labor supply between likely participants in the two types of
states ("main effects"), largely from a difference in labor supply between un-
likely participants in the two types of states, or some combination. Similarly,
the estimates of ('VI - a /) can be identified largely from differences in the
drop-off in labor supply from ages 40-49 to ages 60-64 among likely partici-
pants in the two types of states ("main effects"), or more from differences
among unlikely participants. Whether or not the estimates reflect main
effects does not render the empirical procedure valid or invalid (if it did,
there would be little reason to use differenc~-in-differenceestimation), but
may bear on the interpretation of the estimates. In particular, researchers
are more likely to place confidence in the results if they show up in the main
effects, and are not driven primarily by differences in behavior among un-
likely participants in high and low supplement states, which could arise from
omitted state-specific influences on the behavior of unlikely participants.
Table 4 provides evidence on this question, by reporting the decomposi-
tion of the difference-in-difference estimates into the differences in be-
havior for the likely participants and the differences for the unlikely par-
ticipants. Especially for the direct employment and hours labor supply
measures, most (65 to 78 percent) of the estimated effects come from the
comparison between the likely participants. Indeed, for employment and
hours the estimates ofthe differences in the drop-off from ages 40-49 to 60-
64 between likely participants in the two types of states are statistically signif-
icant at the 5- or I O-percent level.30
Conclusion
Means testing of social security is one way to resolve the pending social
security imbalance, but it has been largely dismissed as a real policy alterna-
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TABLE 4. Decompositions of Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects ofSSI on
Labor Supply
Years ofcovered
Social Security Family
Employed Hours employment Earnings
Levels, 60-64
a. Likely participant, high -.07 -8.03 -2.76 627.11
supplement state
- likely participant, no
supplement state
b. Unlikely participant, high .04 3.04 1.60 616.13**
supplement state
- unlikely participant, no
supplement state
Difference-in-difference -.11 -11.06* -4.36 10.97
estimate (a. - b.)
Percentage of estimate from .65 .73 .63
likely participant
comparison
Difference, 60-64 vs. 40-49
a. (as above) -.15* -14.13** -1.69 -597.13
b. (as above) .05 4.08 1.74 315.53
Difference-in-difference -.20** -18.20** -3.42 -912.66
estimate (a. - b.)
Percentage of estimate from .75 .78 .49 .65
likely participant
comparison
Source: Authors' calculations, 1984 SIPP. Estimates are based on the specifications and sample
in Panel A of Table 3, although excluding the demographic controls. See notes to Tables 2 and
3 for additional details.
tive. This chapter gathers some existing evidence and offers new informa-
tion required to evaluate how such policy might influence behavior. We
draw inferences about the potential consequences of means testing social
security by studying the effects ofSSI for the aged, which currently operates
as a sort of means-tested retirement program. State-level variation in gener-
osity of supplemental SSI payments is used to identifY the effects of SSI on
labor supply as men approach the age of eligibility for the program, study-
ing a sample of male household heads. We find evidence that SSI dis-
courages work among men nearing the age ofeligibility, as one might an tici-
pate given the way the SSI program penalizes post-65 income and assets.
While the relevance of these results for a social security program would
depend on the exact parameters of a means-tested program, we believe that
our evidence implies that the cautious approach that has been taken in the
past to the means-testing option isjustified.
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These results must be used cautiously both as evidence on the effects of
SSI, and as evidence on the likely consequences of means testing social
security. With respect to the evidence on the effects of SSI, we emphasize
that these are the first estimates ofwhich we are aware of the effects ofSSI on
pre-retirement labor supply, and additional analyses should be done using
other data sets. With respect to using our findings regarding SSI to infer the
likely consequences of a means-tested social security program, there are
three issues that must be kept in mind. First, it is always possible that any new
program might be sufficiently different from SSI that our results would not
generalize. Second, if the alternative to the means-tested program - for
example, a partially-privatized component of a two-tier program - either
operates or is perceived to operate very differently from the current social
security system, behavioral responses to a means-tested program might dif-
fer from the responses to SSI that we estimate. Finally, the SSI program
serves a poor population, whereas social security, even if means tested,
would be likely to continue to serve a higher-income population for which
behavioral responses might differ.
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Notes
1. For some U.S. workers (e.g., relatively low-earning spouses in two-earner fam-
ilies) it is literally true that an additional dollar of payroll tax contributed will not
increase the old-age benefit at all.
2. The Concord Coalition advocates "affluence testing" all entitlement programs,
not just social security.
3. In the 1970s, Milton Friedman proposed means testing social security (Fried-
man and Cohen 1972).
4. The exempt amount for couples was $13,500 in 1997.
5. The base of the tax includes one-half of social security income. The source for
the 1995 figures is Congressional Budget Office projections reported in the 1994
Green Book (Committee on Ways and Means 1994).
6. The Concord Coalition plan is thus an income-tested, but not asset-tested,
scheme.
7. This is akin to the current federal approach to education finance, where a
portion of parents' annuitized wealth holdings is added to their incomes to deter-
mine how much of their child's education they are expected to finance.
8. The recent social security "privatization" literature reflects this problem, tend-
ing to rely more on theoretical and simulation methods, as well as discussion of
privatization schemes in other countries, most notably Chile. See for instance, Altig
and Gokhale (1996), Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993), Feldstein (1995), Gustman
and Steinmeier (1995), Kotlikoff (1995), Mitchell and Zeldes (1996), and Pennacchi
(this volume).
9. The historical information in this section is drawn from Schultz et al. (1991).
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10. By the standards of U.S. private saving, these asset limits were fairly high at
$76,300 (in 1985 U.S. dollars) for couples who owned homes; and $150,000 for
couples who rented (housing equity is excluded from the asset test).
11. The asset test was reintroduced in 1986 in large part as a response to the
popular beliefthat this type of "evasion" was widespread.
12. Powers (forthcoming) examines the impact of the asset test applied in the
AFDC program. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) use a simulation model to
assess the impact of asset tests associated with U.S. welfare programs collectively.
13. Unlike social security, there is no early retirement option in the SSI program.
However, the SSI program also provides benefits to the blind and disabled irrespec-
tive ofage, and is also linked to a health care program, Medicaid. We do not consider
these components of the program in this paper.
14. Kahn (1987) discusses the definition of countable assets, and McGarry (1996)
provides more details regarding the SSI program.
15. Zedlewski and Meyer (1989) estimate that about 30 percent ofthe elderly poor
receive SSI benefits.
16. If states choose to administer the SSI program, they are also free to set their
own eligibility criteria such as asset limits. However, many (but not all) states use the
federal criteria (Social Security Administration 1985).
17. The SIPP actually identifies "householders," who are the individuals in whose
name the home is owned or rented (also referred to as "reference persons"). In the
case of a married couple owning a house jointly, either the husband or wife can be
listed as the householder. The data set documentation provides no guidance as to
who is classified as the householder in the case. To avoid selecting males who might
be less likely to be classified as heads of household based on other criteria, we
selected only records on male householders. In fact, the majority of those receiving
SSI for the aged are single women (Kahn 1987), because of the greater life expec-
tancy and lower earnings ofwomen.
18. A continuous benefits measure would use all of the available information. On
the other hand, all we know about individuals prior to age 65 is the maximum benefit
available, not the benefit they would actually receive. In addition, the maximum SSI
benefits reported in the Green Book (Committee on Ways and Means) are subject to
error for some states. For three states (Minnesota, Vermont, and Washington) bene-
fit levels vary by location, and the maximum reported is for metropolitan areas
rather than a statewide level. Since none ofthese states is classified as paying benefits
exceeding 20 percent of the federal level, this measurement problem does not result
in misclassification when this particular threshold is used. Regardless of these consid-
erations, the qualitative results are similar using a continuous measure of maximum
benefits (including all states), or - as in the reported results - distinguishing states
with generous supplemental benefits from states that do not supplement benefits.
Appendix Table Al discusses state supplemental benefit patterns.
19. We suspect that trivially small supplements have no effect on behavior. This was
confirmed in unreported results using a zero threshold for the supplement dummy
variable, for which the estimated effects were weaker but qualitatively similar than
those reported in the paper.
20. We also experimented with using a continuous measure of the estimated
probability of participation; the results were similar to those reported below.
21. The notation YI ... means the expectation ofYconditional on the information
that follows the I.
22. For example, the difference-in-difference parameter capturing the effect of
generous state SSI supplementation on the level of Y for likely participants aged
60-64 is
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(YISup~l,pan~l,Agc6064~1- YISupp~I,Pafl~O,Age6064~I)
- (Ylsupp~O,Pafl~1 ,Age6064~1 - Ylsupp~O,Pafl~O,Age6064~I)
= (,,/ + 8+ 0 + "/' + 8' + 0' - 8- 0 - 8' - 0') - (,,/ + 8+ 0 - 8 - 0) = ,,/'.
23. In principle, we could also use variation over time in state supplemental bene-
fit levels, and hence use the earlier observations on likely participants in a state as
a "control group." However, variation over time in state supplements is minimal,
with many states staying fixed (nominally) from year to year, and most states having
only small changes over longer periods (Committee on Ways and Means, various
years).
24. Because the variable measuring years of food stamp receipt may reflect both
age effects and cohort effects, we do not remove the effect of age on this variable in
estimating the probability of participation for those under age 64 based on the
probit estimates. That is, a 60-year-old with 10 years on food stamps might not have
lower permanent income or a lower propensity to enroll than a 50-year-old with the
same number of years on food stamps, if cohort effects have boosted food stamp
usage among younger cohorts.
25. Because we assume financial resources are endogenous with SSI participation,
we do not include them in our estimation of participation probabilities. Not surpris-
ingly, financial resources are strongly negatively correlated with SSI participation
(McGarry 1996).
26. Some care must be exercised in interpreting the estimates of W, ,,/', (W - a'),
and (,,/' - a') as effects of SSI on labor supply. Because supplemental benefit levels
may influence participation, an indicator of the benefit levels was included in the
participation equation. In principle, then, a change in benefit levels could also
change the classification ofan individual as a "likely participant." Because we do not
allow such changes in estimating the effects ofSSI, the estimates must be interpreted
conditional on this classification not changing. Such an interpretation is likely to be
valid for most of the observations in the data set, with the exception of those initially
on the border line between being classified as a likely or unlikely participant.
27. In Appendix Table A2, we report estimates of the same specifications using the
75th and 95th centiles of the estimated probabilities of participation, rather than the
90th. As expected if the disincentive effects are stronger for more likely participants,
the estimated effects of SSI are weaker when the 75th centile is used, and stronger
when the 95th centile is used. This holds true for the estimated effects for 60-64 year
olds. Using the 75th centile (in Panel A), the signs of the estimated effects are
generally the same as for the 90th centile - in the direction oflabor supply disincen-
tive effects-although the estimated effects are not statistically significant. On the
other hand, using the 95th centile yields uniformly larger estimated effects, with the
estimates of (,,/' - a') statistically significant at the 5- or IO-percent level for the three
direct labor supply measures. However, the standard errors are quite a bit larger than
when the 90th centile is used. Thus, results using the 90th centile are used in the
remainder of the paper.
28. The restriction to those without a work-impairing disability reduces the sample
size by 462. When we deleted an additional 83 observations with transfer income
from any means-tested program, the results were very similar.
29, McGarry (1996) notes that this occurs frequently.
30. The estimates come from the same specification and sample used in Panel A of
Table 3, although dropping the demographic controls because they are so strongly
associated with use of SSI (see Table 2). As the second-ta-Iast row in each panel of
Table 4 shows, the difference-in-difference estimates were little changed by dropping
the demographic controls.
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APPENDIX TABLE AI. State 551 Supplemental Maximum Benefits, 1985
>20% oj Federall~
State Individuals Couples Federal Benefit Administered
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas Yes
California 179 448 Yes Yes
Colorado 58 278 Yes
Connecticut 172 119 Yes
Delaware Yes
Washington, D.C. 15 30 Yes
Florida
Georgia Yes
Hawaii 5 9 Yes
Illinois 35 34
Indiana
Iowa Yes
Kansas Yes
Kentucky
Louisiana Yes
Maine 10 15 Yes
Maryland Yes
Massachusetts 129 202 Yes Yes
Michigan 27 40 Yes
Minnesota 35 66
Missouri
Montana Yes
Nebraska 61 89
Nevada 37 74 Yes
New Hampshire 27 21
NewJersey 31 25 Yes
New York 61 76 Yes
orth Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio Yes
Oklahoma 60 120 Yes
Oregon 2
Pennsylvania 32 49 Yes
Rhode Island 54 102 Yes Yes
South Carolina
Tennessee Yes
Texas
Utah 10 20
Vermont 53 97 Yes
Virginia
Washington 38 37 Yes
Wisconsin 100 161 Yes Yes
Source: 1985 Green Book and Kahn (1987). Sample is restricted to states individually identi-
fied in the SIPP. The maximum federal benefits were $325 for individuals, and $488 for
couples. Classification in column 3 is based on maximum benefit for either an individual or a
couple. In California and Wisconsin, the cash value of food stamps is included in the supple-
ment (Zedlewski and Meyer 1989). For a small number of individuals living \vith non-recipients
or ineligible spouses, the maximum benefit is reduced.
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APPENDIX TABLE A2. 5ensitivity Analysis for Estimated Effects of 551 in Panel B of
Table 2, Alternative Definitions of Likely 551 Participants,
Male Household Heads Aged 40-64
Years ofCovered
Soc. Sec. Family
Employed Hours Employment Earnings
Estimator Probit Tobit Tobit Tobit
A. Using 75th eentile ofparticipation probabilities
Effect of 551 on .04 5.04 1.56 -254.33
50-59 year- (.05) (3.26) (2.48) (314.18)
olds «(3')
Effect of 551 on -.05 -3.37 -2.03 - 180.88
60-64 year- (.06) (4.57) (3.49) (435.30)
olds (-y')
Effect of 551 on -.01 1.57 3.61 -670.18
50-59 year- (.07) (4.54) (3.45) (437.26)
olds relative to
40-49 year
olds «(3' - n')
Effect of 551 on -.01 -6.83 .02 -596.73
60-64 year- (.08) (5.62) (4.28) (537.00)
olds relative to
40-49 year
olds «(3' - n')
Log likelihood -1129.8 11562.7 -10663.8 -23436.4
B. Using 95th eentile ofparticipation probabilities
Effect of 551 on .09 10.94** 4.72 -53.79
50-59 year- (.07) (5.44) (4.19) (534.45)
olds (13')
Effect of 551 on -.09 - 14.10 -13.34** -672.82
60-64 year- (.10) (8.66) (6.70) (849.79)
olds (-y')
Effect of 55I on -.08 -1.79 2.37 -747.88
50-59 year- (.11) (8.27) (6.32) (805.22)
olds relative to
40-49 year
olds «(3' - n')
Effect of55I on -.26* -26.84** -15.69* -1366.91
60-64 year- (.14) (10.72) (8.24) (1046.52)
olds relative to
40-49 year
olds (-y' - n')
Log likelihood -1119.4 -11551.9 -10655.9 -23428.7
Source: Authors' calculations, ]984 SIPP. There are 2940 observations in Panels A and B. The
75th cemile of participation probabilities (as well as the 80th and 85th centiles) is .0381; the
95th centile is .0962. See notes to Table 2 for additional details.
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